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Abstract
This paper revisits the economic analysis of contract law for a set-
ting of cooperative investments. While Che and Chung (1999) have
shown that expectation damages perform rather poorly, the present
paper argues that this negative result follows from their impicit as-
sumption of unilateral expectation damages. Yet, the very nature of
cooperative investments gives rise to the possibility that both par-
ties may claim expectation damages. It is shown that such a regime
of bilateral expectation damages provides the incentives for the first
best solution even in a framework of binary choice where, for selfish
investments, the traditional overreliance result would hold.
JEL classification: K12, D62
∗The author wants to thank two referees as well as the editor in charge of this paper
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1 Introduction
In a setting of relationship-specific investments, Che and Chung (1999) have
explored various breach remedies for investments that generate direct bene-
fits to the investing party’s trading partner. Such cooperative investments as
they are called are important for buyer-supplier alliances in industrial pur-
chasing. Che and Chung mention investments by a supplier that increase the
quality of a good or service procured by the buyer, efforts to customize com-
ponents to the special needs of manufacturers and workers’ paying attention
to their jobs as examples of cooperative investments. Their main findings
are that expectation damages perform very poorly, privately stipulated liq-
uidated damages generate better but still inefficient incentives to invest and
reliance damages perform the best.
These results stand in contrast to the earlier findings of the literature
which has mainly dealt with selfish investments. Examples of such invest-
ments include situations where a supplier invests to lower his production
costs or reliances of a buyer who expects the supplier to perform. Edlin
and Reichelstein (1996) show that, for selfish investments and in a setting of
continuous quantity choice, expectation damages may well generate efficient
incentives to invest. Shavell (1980) considers selfish investments followed by
a binary choice. He shows that expectation damages lead to overreliance but
less so than reliance damages. Rogerson (1984) extends Shavell’s analysis to
the case where ex post negotiations always occur successfully and costlessly.
Expectation damages still outperform reliance damages if, at the investment
stage, the parties anticipate renegotiations.
The present paper revisits cooperative investments. While German con-
tract law serves as background, other legal systems seem very similar with
respect to what matters for the present analysis. In principle, the promisee
is entitled to specific performance. But, for practical purposes, a substan-
tial part of all cases are governed by expectation damages.1 The promisee,
instead of expectation damages, can also claim reliance damages.2 Since dis-
putes typically arise ex post, a rational promisee will do so only if reliance
1See §§ 280, 283 BGB where BGB (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) refers to the German
Civil Code of 2 January 2002.
2See BGB § 284.
2
damages exceed expectation damages at that stage. Therefore, at least under
German contract law, the question of whether reliance damages outperform
expectation damages is of lesser concern. If the promisee does not claim
reliance damages he will be granted expectation damages, no matter which
of the two perform better. As a matter of fact, in a setting such as the one
studied by Che and Chung, reliance damages would give the promisee zero
net profits while, under expectation damages, he would end up, in monetary
terms, as if the promisor had performed. Given that the promisee has ac-
cepted the contract initially, his net profit under performance will typically be
positive. Therefore the promisee, in case of breach, would claim expectation
and not reliance damages.
Does this mean that (German) contract law is not well designed to handle
incomplete contracts among parties facing a situation of cooperative invest-
ments? The present paper defends contract law on this account. It argues
that, in the case of cooperative investments, both parties are promisors and
promisees at the same time. In fact, think of party A as a buyer who invests
into the technology of party B as the seller. High investments would lead to
low production costs for the seller. The (incomplete) contract stipulates a
level of investments of A and a quantity to be delivered by B at some later
stage as well as a net transfer price for the overall transaction. If B refuses
to deliver A may claim compensation. But B may also claim damages if A
has underinvested relative to the level specified in the contract. I shall refer
to this regime as bilateral expectation damages. The main findings of the
present paper are that, no matter whether renegotiations can be ruled out or
not, bilateral expectation damages perform very well in cases of cooperative
investments. In fact, even the first best can be achieved.
Che and Chung examine what I call unilateral expectation damages and
where only party A can claim expectation damages if B fails to deliver but
B cannot claim damages from A for insufficient investments. To be sure,
determining the true level of bilateral expectation damages may be more
demanding than that of unilateral damages. But to imagine that the parties
have signed a contract which remains silent about investments seems to take
the case to the other extreme.
To defend the approach of Che and Chung by making use of the language
of contract theory, one might argue that delivery of the product is verifiable in
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front of courts while investments are not. In such an informational setting,
unilateral expectation damages may be verifiable while bilateral ones are
not. In fact, Che and Chung also investigate liquidated damages where
they restrict parties to condition on delivery but not on investments, well in
line with the above assumption on verifiability. Yet, by promoting reliance
damages, they do not strictly adhere to this assumption because, for reliance
damages to work, investments would have to be verifiable as well. In any case,
while Che and Chung have provided a very interesting analysis of cooperative
investments under some second best constraint the present paper provides
the pure theory of such investments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of
cooperative investments and it spells out the game induced by bilateral ex-
pectation damages and by more general regimes of bilateral compensation.
Section 3 solves the game induced by such regimes. The first best can be
reached if renegotiations are ruled out as well as if inefficient ex post deci-
sions are expected to be renegotiated. It is this section which establishes
that expectation damages perform particularly well in the case of coopera-
tive investments provided, of course, that their bilateral nature is taken into
account. The efficiency results follows from the fact that the efficient solution
forms a saddle point of both parties’ payoff functions. Section 4 compares
the findings of the present paper with those of Che and Chung (1999) who
examine unilateral expectation damages where the investing party only may
claim damages. Section 5 revisits contracting under reliance damages. For
binary delivery choice, the first best can be reached. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Two parties A and B are involved in a seller-buyer relationship. At stage
1, party A faces an investment decision r ∈ R. Then, at stage 2, there is
a random move ω ∈ Ω of nature. Party B’s delivery choice y ∈ Y is due
at stage 3. Our notation is general enough to cover both cases where the
buyer or the seller is the investing party. Moreover, choice sets do not have
to be restricted. Decisions could be continuous or discrete and they are even
allowed to be more than one-dimensional.
Before any compensation takes place, the net profits of party A and B are
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denoted by A(r,ω, y) and B(r,ω, y), referred to as pre-law payoff functions.
The social surplus is denoted by W (r,ω, y) = A(r,ω, y) + B(r,ω, y). For
given investments r and move ω of nature, the socially best response is
y+(r,ω) ∈ argmax
y∈Y
W (r,ω, y).
The efficient investment decision solves
r∗ ∈ argmax
r∈R
E
h
W (r,ω, y+(r,ω))
i
.
It is tacitly assumed that the above optimization problems have solutions.
Moreover, the socially best response to efficient investments y∗(ω) = y+(r∗,ω)
is called the efficient delivery choice. Finally, the efficient solution (first best)
is reached if A invests efficiently and if B responds with the efficient delivery
choice.
Imagine now that the parties have signed contract [r¯, y¯, T ] stipulating
that A should invest r¯ ∈ R, B should choose y¯ ∈ Y in consideration of
which the net payment from A to B is T . The actual investment decision
and delivery choice are denoted by r and y, respectively. Then party A may
claim damages from B if B has violated the contract (y 6= y¯) and if his
violating the contract has led to a loss for A, i.e. A(r,ω, y¯) > A(r,ω, y). For
short, A may claim expectation damages from B amounting to
DA(r,ω, y) = max[A(r,ω, y¯)−A(r,ω, y), 0]. (1)
By the same token, party B may claim expectation damages from A amount-
ing to
DB(r,ω, y) = max[B(r,ω, y)−B(r,ω, y), 0]. (2)
The main focus will be on bilateral expectation damages in the above
sense. Yet, in cases of unjustified enrichment or agency of necessity, B may
also claim compensation from A if B’s deviation (y 6= y¯) has lead to a gain
for A, i.e. A(r,ω, y¯) < A(r,ω, y).3 Under full compensation, party A’s claim
would amount to
DA(r,ω, y) = A(r,ω, y¯)−A(r,ω, y) (3)
3See §§ 812 - 822 BGB (unjustified enrichement) and §§ 677 - 687 BGB (agency of
necessity). I am grateful to Hans-Bernd Schäfer who has pointed out the relevance of
unjustified enrichment and agency of necessity for the present setting.
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and similarly for party B.
Finally, the law may also provide for intermediate cases. If parties A and
B can claim compensation in the ranges
A(r,ω, y¯)−A(r,ω, y) ≤ DA(r,ω, y) ≤ max[A(r,ω, y¯)−A(r,ω, y), 0]
and
B(r,ω, y)−B(r,ω, y) ≤ DB(r,ω, y) ≤ max[B(r,ω, y)−B(r,ω, y), 0] (4)
then the relationship is governed by a regime of bilateral compensation. The
aim of the present paper is to explore the incentives arising from such regimes.
Notice, under any regime of bilateral compensation in the above sense,
DA(r,ω, y) = 0 and DB(r,ω, y) = 0
must hold for all r, ω and y. The post-law payoff functions of A and B under
a regime of bilateral compensation are denoted as
φ(r,ω, y) = A(r,ω, y) +DA(r,ω, y)−DB(r,ω, y)− T
and ψ(r,ω, y) =W (r,ω, y)− φ(r,ω, y), respectively.
The focus of the present paper is on cooperative investments. While party
A must cover investment costs g(r), cooperative investments do not directly
affect her own benefitsH(ω, y) but they directly enter the other party’s payoff
function. In other words, under cooperative investments, A’s payoff function
A(r,ω, y) = H(ω, y)− g(r) is additively separable in investments.
At the other extreme, investments are called selfish if A’s investments
do not directly enter B’s payoff function, i.e. B = B(ω, y). Notice, under
any regime of bilateral compensation, party B cannot raise any claims, i.e.
DB(r,ω, y) ≡ 0 if investments are of the selfish type. In other words, for
selfish investments, there is no difference between unilateral and bilateral
compensation.
Much of the earlier literature on the economic analysis of contract law
including Che and Chung (1999) deals with continuous and one-dimensional
investment decisions R = [0,∞) combined with binary delivery choice Y =
{yL, yH}. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), in contrast, examine continuous
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choice though in a setting of selfish investments. Their model adapted to co-
operative investments may also serve as an illustration of the present frame-
work. Party A is facing again a one-dimensional continuous investment de-
cision r ∈ R = [0,∞) before party B must decide on a continuous delivery
choice y ∈ Y ⊂ [0,∞). The above two examples are referred to as binary
and continuous delivery choice, respectively.
3 The Main Results
From the economic perspective, efficiency properties of the game with post-
law payoff functions induced by regimes of bilateral compensation are at
stake. Desirable properties include that the efficient solution is a subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome, all subgame perfect equilibria are payoff equiv-
alent, and, renegotiations off the equilibrium path do not distort incentives.
It turns out that all these desirable properties follow from the so-called sad-
dle point property which requires the efficient solution to be a saddle point
of the post-law payoff functions. The saddle point property follows from the
two conditions
φ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω)) ≤ φ(r∗,ω, y) and ψ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω)) ≤ ψ(r,ω, y∗(ω)) (5)
which must hold for all r, ω and y. In fact, it follows from (5) that
ψ(r∗,ω, y) = W (r∗,ω, y)− φ(r∗,ω, y) ≤
W (r∗,ω, y∗(ω))− φ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω)) = ψ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω)) ≤ ψ(r,ω, y∗(ω))
and, similarly, that
E [φ(r,ω, y∗(ω))] ≤ E [φ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))] ≤ E [φ(r∗,ω, y)]
must hold for all r and y. In this sense, (5) is sufficient to ensure that the
efficient solution is a saddle point of B’s post-law payoff function and of
A’s post-law payoff function in expected terms. The following proposition
establishes that condition (5) implies the desirable properties of efficiency.
Proposition 1 Suppose the post-law payoff functions satisfy the saddle point
property (5). Then the efficient solution emerges under subgame perfect equi-
librium. All subgame perfect equilibria are payoff equivalent. This remains to
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be true even if, off the equilibrium path, parties anticipate inefficient delivery
choices to be renegotiated.
Proof. Before proving the proposition, two lemmas are established.
Lemma 1 If yB(r,ω) ∈ argmaxy ψ(r,ω, y) and if rA is such that
E
h
φ(rA,ω, yB(rA,ω))
i
≥ E
h
φ(r∗,ω, yB(r∗,ω))
i
,
then [rA, yB(rA,ω))] is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and it holds
that
E
h
φ(rA,ω, yB(rA,ω))
i
= E [φ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))]
and
E
h
ψ(rA,ω, yB(rA,ω))
i
= E [ψ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))] .
Proof of Lemma 1. It follows from the saddle point property (5) and
the assumptions of the lemma that
E
h
φ(rA,ω, yB(rA,ω))
i
≥ E
h
φ(r∗,ω, yB(r∗,ω))
i
≥ E [φ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))]
and
E
h
ψ(rA,ω, yB(rA,ω))
i
≥ E
h
ψ(rA,ω, y∗(ω))
i
≥ E [ψ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))] .
Hence, by summing up,
E
h
W (rA,ω, yB(rA,ω))
i
≥ E [W (r∗,ω, y∗(ω))] .
Since the efficient solution maximizes expected surplus, the last inequality
must be binding and, hence, the other inequalities must be binding as well.
As a consequence, rA must be optimal from A’s view and, hence, Lemma 1
is established.
If investments r and state of nature ω are such that B’s best response
yB(r,ω) fails to be a socially best response then renegotiations may lead to
a different delivery choice yˆ(r,ω) and to post-renegotiation payoffs φˆ(r,ω)
and ψˆ(r,ω) for A and B. Since both parties must agree to renegotiate, the
following participation constraints
φˆ(r,ω) ≥ φ(r,ω, yB(r,ω)) and ψˆ(r,ω) ≥ ψ(r,ω, yB(r,ω))
have to be met. Moreover,
φˆ(r,ω) + ψˆ(r,ω) =W (r,ω, yˆ(r,ω))
must hold. With this notation, the following lemma can be established.
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Lemma 2 If yB(r,ω) ∈ argmaxy ψ(r,ω, y) and if rˆ is such that
E
h
φˆ(rˆ,ω)
i
≥ E
h
φˆ(r∗,ω)
i
,
then [rˆ, yB(rˆ,ω))] is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and it holds that
E
h
φˆ(rˆ,ω)
i
= E [φ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))]
and
E
h
ψˆ(rˆ,ω)
i
= E [ψ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))] .
The proof of Lemma 2 follows along similar lines as the one of Lemma
1 and, for that reason, is omitted. By making use of the two lemmas, the
proposition can be established as follows. It follows from the saddle point
property, that y∗(ω) is a best response of B to r∗ and ω. Lemma 1 then
immediately leads to the conclusion that the efficient solution must be a sub-
game perfect equilibrium outcome. Lemma 1 also implies that all subgame
perfect equilibria must be payoff equivalent.
If, off the equilibrium path, renegotiations take place then it follows from
Lemma 2 that r∗ remains to be a best decision of A. Moreover, if other
equilibria exist, they must be payoff equivalent under renegotiations as well
as follows from Lemma 2. Proposition 1 is fully established.
Notice, while the existing literature mainly deals with explicit solutions
of the renegotiation game such as splitting the renegotiation surplus in fixed
shares, the above proposition is more general as it only makes use of the
participation constraints. It is not even required that renegotiations always
lead to ex post efficient decisions.
As a next step, the saddle point property is expressed in terms of the
damage rule in a way which holds for all investment types. The result will
then be applied to the more specific cases of cooperative and selfish invest-
ments. The proposition holds under the following assumptions. Party A’s
claims do not depend on actual investments, i.e. DA = DA(ω, y) and
DA(ω, y) ≥ A(r∗,ω, y¯)−A(r∗,ω, y) (6)
holds for all ω and y. Moreover, at efficient delivery choices y∗(ω), (6) is
assumed to be binding. Under these assumptions, the following proposition
can be established.
9
Proposition 2 If the parties have signed a contract stipulating efficient in-
vestments (i.e. r¯ = r∗) and if the above assumptions are met, then the
post-law payoff functions satisfy the saddle point property (5).
Proof. The proof is very elementary. It follows from (6) that
φ(r∗,ω, y) = A(r∗,ω, y) +DA(ω, y)− T ≥ A(r∗,ω, y)− T = φ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))
and from (4) that
ψ(r,ω, y∗(ω)) = B(r,ω, y∗(ω)) +DB(r,ω, y∗(ω))−DA(ω, y∗(ω)) + T
≥ B(r∗,ω, y∗(ω)) +A(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))−A(r∗,ω, y¯) + T = ψ(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))
must hold for all r, ω and y. The saddle point property is fully established.
The driving force behind the above result is that A’s claims are subject to
full compensation where compensation must be based on efficient investments
even if actual investments were different.
Let us, first, apply the proposition to cooperative investments. In this
case,
A(r,ω, y¯)−A(r,ω, y) = H(ω, y¯)−H(ω, y)
does not depend on actual investments and, hence, it seems natural if A’s
claims neither depend on actual investments. Moreover, if the contract spec-
ifies a delivery choice y¯ = yH such that
H(ω, y∗(ω)) ≤ H(ω, y¯) (7)
holds for all states ω then the assumption of the proposition necessarily
holds whenever A is granted expectation damages according to (1). In other
words, contracts specifying a delivery choice from the proper range combined
with expectation damages in the strict sense induce all desirable efficiency
properties if investments are of the cooperative type.
Second, in the case of selfish investments, the assumption that A’s claims
should not depend on actual investments is not in line with legal practice.
If expectation damages are granted, they will be based on actual, not on
fictitious decisions. In this sense, while formally correct for all types of in-
vestments, Proposition 2 is of practical relevance for the case of cooperative
investments only.
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If, in the case of selfish investments, party A’s claims were based on actual
decisions, subject to full compensation (3) then A’s post-law payoff would
amount to φ = φ(r,ω) = A(r,ω, y¯) − T , no matter how B actually decides.
Therefore, party B’s post-law payoff would be W (r,ω, y) − A(r,ω, y¯) + T
such that B’s best response would always coincide with the socially best
response. As a consequence, on and off the equilibrium path, there would be
no scope for renegotiations. In order to provide efficient incentives to invest,
the contract would require fine tuning with respect to the stipulated delivery
choice y¯. In other words, in the case of selfish investments, either expectation
damages must be based on fictitious investments or the contract must be fine
tuned with respect to the delivery choice as specified in the contract.
Moreover, still in the case of selfish investments, specifying y¯ high enough
to have expectation damages (1) resulting in full compensation (3) may be
in conflict with the fine tuning required to provide efficient investment in-
centives. Nevertheless, Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) have shown that, for
selfish investments in the continuous delivery choice model, specifying a con-
stant delivery choice may still provide efficient incentives to invest provided
that renegotiations to socially best responses can be assumed always to take
place. Since the saddle point property no longer holds, their argument is
more intricate. In particular, fine tuning would be involved again.
A final remark on bilateral expectation damages in the setting of cooper-
ative investments seems in order. Suppose the contract stipulates a delivery
choice such that (7) is violated with positive probability. Then the efficient
delivery choice will no longer be B’s best response to efficient investments.
Yet, if ex post inefficient responses are always renegotiated to the socially best
response, fine tuning could again be conjectured to restore full efficiency. To
explore the conjecture, let us consider the example of continuous delivery
choice with the specifications
Hy(ω, y) > 0, By(r,ω, y) < 0, Hyy(ω, y) +Byy(r,ω, y) < 0
and
Br(r,ω, y) > 0, Bry(r,ω, y) > 0 and gr(r) > 0.
Suppose the contract stipulates efficient investments r¯ = r∗ but A considers
to choose investments from the range r ≤ r∗ instead. Then, as follows from
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(4),
DB(r,ω, y) = B(r∗,ω, y)−B(r,ω, y)
and party B’s post-law payoff amounts to
ψ = ψ(ω, y) =



B(r∗,ω, y) +H(ω, y)−H(ω, y¯) + T if y ≤ y¯
B(r∗,ω, y) + T if y¯ ≤ y
and, hence, B’s best response is
yB = yB(ω) =



y∗(ω) if y∗(ω) ≤ y¯
y if y¯ ≤ y∗(ω)
as follows from the concavity of social surplus with respect to delivery choice.
Under B’s best response and without renegotiations, A’s payoff amounts to
φ(r,ω, yB(ω)) = B(r,ω, yB(ω))−B(r∗,ω, yB(ω)) +H(ω, y¯)− g(r)− T.
If ex post inefficient responses are renegotiated to a socially best response
and if A obtains a fixed share α of the renegotiation surplus then A’s payoff
with renegotiations amounts to
φˆ(r,ω) = W (r,ω, y+(r,ω)) + γ(ω) +
(1− α)
h
W (r,ω, yB(ω))−W (r,ω, y+(r,ω))
i
where γ(ω) collects terms that do not depend on actual investments r. It
follows that the derivative from the left at r∗
d
dr
E
h
φˆ(r∗,ω)
i
= (1− α)E
h
Br(r
∗,ω, yB(ω))−Br(r∗,ω, y∗(ω))
i
< 0
must be negative. To summarize the findings, recall that cooperative invest-
ments in a model of continuous delivery choice are at stake. By assumption,
the contract specifies a delivery choice such that (7) is violated with pos-
itive probability. Then, even if ex post inefficient responses are costlessly
renegotiated to a socially best response, incentives to invest are distorted
downwards.
The main conclusion of the present section is that, under the regime
of bilateral expectation damages and with contracts that specify a delivery
choice in the range (7), the investing party in a setting of cooperative invest-
ments has efficient incentives, no matter whether inefficient delivery choices
are renegotiated or not. These findings are in contrast to those of Che and
Chung (1999). The next section examines the differences.
12
4 Unilateral Expectation Damages
Che and Chung (1999) investigate the case of unilateral expectation damages
where only the investing party can claim expectation damages. While Che
and Chung have dealt with binary delivery choice, there analysis can be
generalized as follows. Party B’s post-law payoff function under a regime of
unilateral expectation damages is
ψu(r,ω, y) = B(r,ω, y) + T −max[H(ω, y¯)−H(ω, y), 0].
For simplicity, let us assume that there exist delivery choices yL, yH ∈ Y such
that
H(ω, y) ≤ H(ω, yH) (8)
and
H(ω, yL) ≤ H(ω, y) and B(r,ω, y) ≤ B(r,ω, yL) (9)
hold for all states of nature and all investment levels. Moreover, let us assume
that investments are one-dimensional R ⊂ [0,∞) such that g(r) is strictly
increasing while B(r,ω, y) is at least weakly increasing in r to capture the
cooperative nature of investments. Think of a continuous delivery choice
setting with a compact choice set Y . If party A is the buyer then take yL
and yH as the minimum and maximum quantity, respectively. Similarly, if
party is the seller then the maximum and minimum quantity could serve as
yL and yH , respectively.
Proposition 3 Suppose the initial contract specifies delivery choice y¯ = yH.
Then, under the regime of unilateral expectation damages, party B’s delivery
choice is the socially best response y+(r,ω). But party A has no incentive to
invest, that is A simply minimizes costs
r = r0 ∈ argmin
r∈R
g(r).
Proof. If delivery choice y¯ = yH has been specified then party B’s post-law
payoff amounts to
ψu(r,ω, y) = B(r,ω, y) +H(ω, y) + T −H(ω, yH).
Hence B has the incentive to choose the socially best response y+(r,ω).
Therefore, party A’s post-law payoff amounts to
φu(r,ω) = H(ω, yH)− T − g(r)
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from which it follows immediately that A has no incentives to invest.
Notice, under bilateral expectation damages, contracts specifying deliv-
ery choice yH provide first best incentives to invest while, under unilateral
expectation damages, they provide no incentives at all.
At the other extreme, the case of contracts is considered which stipu-
late delivery choice yL. Under bilateral expectation damages, such contracts
would perform worse than those which specify yH as has been shown by the
example at the end of the previous section. Under unilateral expectation
damages, however, the converse is true as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4 Suppose the initial contract specifies delivery choice y¯ = yL.
If parties anticipate inefficient delivery choices to be renegotiated then, under
unilateral expectation damages, party A has incentives to invest according to
ru ∈ argmaxαE
h
W (r,ω, y+(r,ω))
i
− βg(r)−E [αB(r,ω, yL)] . (10)
It holds that 0 ≤ ru ≤ r∗ where, typically, both inequalities are strict.
Proof. If delivery choice y¯ = yL has been specified then party B’s post-law
payoff amounts to
ψu(r,ω, y) = B(r,ω, y) + T.
Since, by assumption,
yL ∈ argmax
y∈Y
B(r,ω, y)
it follows that B chooses yL if renegotiations would brake down. If they do
not and if A obtains a fixed share α of the renegotiation surplus, then party
A’s post-renegotiation payoff amounts to
φˆ(r,ω) = H(ω, yL)− g(r)− T +
α
h
W (r,ω, y+(r,ω))−W (r,ω, yL)
i
= βH(ω, yL)− βg(r)− T +
αW (r,ω, y+(r,ω))− αB(r,ω, yL)
from which (10) follows immediately.
The first term in (10) attains its maximum at efficient investments r∗.
The second and third term, by assumption, are strictly decreasing in r. It
follows that 0 ≤ ru ≤ r∗ must hold indeed. In a differentiable setting, the
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inequality would be strict because the derivative of the first term vanishes
at r∗ whereas the second and third term would have a negative derivative
at r∗. Similarly, under mild assumptions, it must hold that ru > 0. The
proposition is established.
In the binary choice setting of Che and Chung [1999], the only two possi-
bilities are to specify either y¯ = yL or y¯ = yH in the contract. Under unilat-
eral expectation damages, specifying y¯ = yL outperforms specifying y¯ = yH .
Renegotiations are needed to ensure efficient delivery choice. Nevertheless,
incentives to invest remain suboptimal.
Under bilateral expectation damages or, more generally, under any regime
of bilateral compensation, specifying y¯ = yH does not only outperform spec-
ifying y¯ = yL but it even induces efficient investments and efficient delivery
choice, no matter whether, off the equilibrium path, renegotiations take place
or can be ruled out.
5 Reliance Damages
In the introduction, I have argued why party A would claim expectation
damages and would not opt for reliance damages. Nevertheless, it might be
worthwhile to explore incentives if only reliance damages were granted. In
the case of cooperative investments, reliance damages of this kind have the
potential to provide efficient incentives to invest, well in line with the earlier
findings of Che and Chung (1999).
Reliance damages are typically confined to binary delivery choice. So let
us assume that Y = {yL, yH} and that assumptions (8) and (9) are met. It
will even be required that, at delivery choice yL, party B’s pre-law payoff is
not affected by party A’s investment decision, i.e.
B(r,ω, yL) = B(ω, yL)
holds for all r. If party B is the seller in a setting of quantity choice, this
assumption would naturally hold: at zero production, the cost structure of
B does not matter.
Finally, well in line with the nature of cooperative investments, it is as-
sumed that g(r) is a strictly, B(r,ω, y) at least a weakly increasing function
of investments r ∈ R ⊂ [0,∞).
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Under reliance damages, contracts would specify a price T which becomes
due in case of performance y = yH . Furthermore, to reflect ex ante bargaining
power, parties may agree to a lump-sum payment t. Taking reliance damages
into account, net payments from A to B amount to
τ(r, y) =



T − t if y = yH
−g(r)− t if y = yL
. (11)
Given the above contract, B’s payoff amounts to
ψ(r,ω, y) = B(r,ω, y) + τ(r, y).
The following proposition can be established.
Proposition 5 Suppose reliance damages only are granted and parties antic-
ipate inefficient delivery choices to be renegotiated. Then party A’s incentives
to invest r(T ) just depend on the price T . Moreover, there exist prices TL and
TH which provide insufficient and excessive incentives to invest, respectively,
i.e.
r(TL) ≤ r∗ ≤ r(TH).
Hence, if r(T ) is a continuous function of the price then there exists a price
T ∗ under which the efficient solution emerges, i.e.
r(T ∗) = r∗.
Proof. Let
yB = yB(r,ω, T ) ∈ argmax
y∈Y
B(r,ω, y) + τ(r, y)
denote B’s delivery choice in case renegotiations would break down. It follows
that
yB(r,ω, T ) =



yH if T +B(r,ω, yH) + g(r) > B(ω, yL)
yL if T +B(r,ω, yH) + g(r) < B(ω, yL)
.
Since B(r,ω, yH)+ g(r) is strictly increasing in r, there exists a cut-off value
r¯(ω, T ) such that yB(r,ω, T ) = yH iff r > r¯(ω, T ).
But renegotiations do not break down if yB fails to be the socially best
response. If party A obtains a fixed share α of the renegotiation surplus, her
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payoff amounts to
φˆ(r,ω, T ) = H(ω, yB(r,ω, T ))− g(r)− τ(r, yB(r,ω, T )) +
α
h
W (r,ω, y+(r,ω))−W (r,ω, yB(r,ω, T ))
i
= βH(ω, yB(r,ω, T ))− βg(r)− αB(r,ω, yB(r,ω, T ))−
τ(r, yB(r,ω, T )) + αW (r,ω, y+(r,ω)).
If we write, for short, φˆ(r,ω, T ) = t+αW (r,ω, y+(r,ω))+M(r,ω, T ) then it
holds that
M(r,ω, T ) =



βH(ω, yH)− T − αB(r,ω, yH)− βg(r) if r¯(ω, T ) < r
βH(ω, yL)− αB(ω, yL) + αg(r) if r < r¯(ω, T )
.
Notice, the function of the second line is strictly increasing whereas the func-
tion of the first line is strictly decreasing in r.
Moreover, given the above contract, the incentives to invest
r = r(T ) ∈ argmaxE
h
φˆ(r,ω, T )
i
just depend on the price T due in case of delivery.
Choose TL such that
TL +B(r
∗,ω, yH) + g(r∗) > B(ω, yL)
and TH such that
TH +B(r
∗,ω, yH) + g(r∗) < B(ω, yL)
hold for all ω. It then follows that r¯(ω, TL) < r∗ and r∗ < r¯(ω, TH) for all
ω. Therefore the function E[M(r,ω, TL)] is strictly decreasing in the range
[r∗,∞) and the function E[M(r,ω, TH)] is strictly increasing in the range
[0, r∗]. Since αE [W (r,ω, y+(r,ω))] attains its maximum at r∗, it follows
that r(TL) ≤ r∗ ≤ r(TH) must hold.
The continuity of r(T ) as a function of T would follow from the concavity
of E[φˆ(r,ω, T )] as a function of r. If such is the case then, as the above
proposition shows, the contract specifying the appropriate price T ∗ leads to
the efficient solution provided that reliance damages are granted to A. For
such a scheme to work, investment levels must be verifiable. Yet, if they are
then bilateral expectation damages could also be enforced. Since bilateral
expectation damages lead to efficient solutions more generally, the results of
the present paper rehabilitate expectation damages for relationship-specific
investments of the cooperative type.
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6 Concluding Remarks
The economic analysis of contract law has examined incentives for invest-
ments under various breach remedies. No doubt, for legal practice, the most
prevalent measure is expectation damages. The early literature concentrates
on selfish investments which directly benefit the investing party. If the per-
formance decision is binary and if investments are selfish then expectation
damages lead to overreliance (Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984)). For self-
ish investments, the first best is induced by expectation damages only if the
performance decision is a continuous delivery choice and if inefficient de-
livery choices are renegotiated to the ex post efficient decision (Edlin and
Reichelstein (1996)). Recall, if investments are of the selfish type, fine tun-
ing is required to specify a delivery choice that does not distort incentives to
invest.
The present paper revisits cooperative investments as first studied by Che
and Chung (1999). It argues that, in the case of cooperative investments,
expectation damages are of a bilateral nature and, as a consequence, that
a strict interpretation of legal provisions gives rise to the rule of bilateral
expectation damages. If the contract specifies a delivery choice high enough
such that A’s claims are always subject to full compensation then bilateral
expectation damages are shown to provide efficient incentives to invest, no
matter whether renegotiations are ruled out or not and no matter whether
the performance decision is binary or not.
If Che and Chung attribute poor performance to expectation damages
in the case of cooperative investments their findings rest on the assumption
that only the investing party may claim damages for breach of contract. Un-
der such a rule, indeed, unilateral expectation damages lead to insufficient
investments and other breach remedies may perform better. Therefore, the
present paper promotes the idea that Che and Chung’s pessimistic view does
not follow from a basic defect of expectation damages but rather from ne-
glecting the bilateral nature which expectation damages naturally feature in
the case of cooperative investments.
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